

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SECURING THE HOMELAND –
HOW SHOULD THE ARMY FULFILL ITS ROLE?

by

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ABSTRACT

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Homeland security, as defined within the existing security strategy framework, requires the United States, its territory, its people, and its interests to be adequately protected. Leaders within the United States have for decades attempted militarily to ensure national security through forward basing and power projection, delegating homeland security to a secondary role. However, the events of 11 September 2001 may have permanently changed how we must think about protection of the homeland. The concepts of homeland security and homeland defense are extremely complex, intertwined, and demand coordinated use of all the instruments of national power both at home and abroad. Within this context, there is a fundamental question that remains unanswered. How should the Army fulfill its homeland security role while continuing to meet the requirements of forward presence, global engagement, and war fighting? This paper addresses this issue by presenting the different definitions of homeland security and homeland defense, analyzing current security strategy documents, and examining the Department of Defense's current force sizing construct. The paper also reviews the components of the Army and what they have contributed to homeland security since 9/11, considers various recommendations by prominent think tanks, and finally, proposes a course of action for the future. It considers recommendations by the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the Heritage Foundation, a RAND Corporation Study, and the Defense Science Board. After comparing and contrasting these alternatives, the author recommends that the Army give the Army National Guard the primary responsibility for homeland security, dedicate twenty regionally-focused Army National Guard battalion size units to homeland security, and dedicate regional United States Army Reserve units with inherent homeland security capabilities. This approach ensures that the nation's first priority of homeland security is adequately resourced without significantly affecting the military's ability to project globally.

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SECURING THE HOMELAND – HOW SHOULD THE ARMY FULFILL ITS ROLE?

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.¹

—John Jay, Federalist Paper Number 3

Our nation's founding fathers frequently discussed the concepts of homeland security.² While there was not always agreement on how to best achieve it, the idea of security was of such enduring value that the framers of the Constitution referenced it in the preamble when they wrote of "domestic Tranquility" and "the common defence."³ The current *National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSS) recognizes this continuing theme when it states, "defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government."⁴

Leaders within the United States have for decades attempted to ensure national security militarily through forward basing and power projection, delegating homeland security to a secondary role. This mindset remains prevalent among many of the senior leaders in Washington today. Vice President Dick Cheney, talking to a group of Coast Guard officers, recently said, "to fully and finally remove this danger [of terrorism], we have only one option – and that's to take the fight to the enemy."⁵ President George W. Bush echoed this belief on 4 July 2004 when he proclaimed, "we will engage these enemies in these countries [Iraq and Afghanistan] and around the world so we do not have to face them here at home."⁶

The events of 11 September 2001 may have permanently changed how we must think about protection of the homeland. Nineteen terrorist armed with box-cutters accomplished a feat beyond the reach of enemy nation-states, an attack upon the national symbols of American financial and military strength.⁷ Recent history has proven that terrorists do not have to smuggle dangerous material into the United States. The instruments of destruction used in the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995, and the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 all came from or were fabricated within the United States.⁸ Astute terrorists could also cause massive destruction and loss of human life by attacking one of the 38,000 storage locations for hazardous materials or any of the more than one thousand nuclear power plants within the country.⁹ Former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge asserts that al Qaeda continues to operate within the United States, waiting for the opportunity to strike again.¹⁰

The concepts of homeland security and homeland defense are extremely complex, intertwined and demand coordinated use of all the instruments of national power both at home

and abroad. Within this context, there is a fundamental question that remains unanswered. How should the Army fulfill its homeland security role while continuing to meet the requirements of forward presence, global engagement, and war fighting? The *Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001* has already suggested that “preparing forces for homeland security may require changes in force structure and organization.”¹¹ There is little doubt that a catastrophic attack at home could force a large commitment of military resources both within the United States and overseas.¹² It is therefore prudent for the United States Army to closely evaluate how it will fulfill its homeland security role while it provides robust support to operations around the world. This paper will address this issue by presenting different definitions for homeland security and homeland defense, analyzing current security strategy documents and examining the Department of Defense’s (DOD) current force sizing construct. The paper will also review the components of the Army and what they have contributed to homeland security since 9/11, compare and contrast various recommendations by prominent think tanks, and finally propose a course of action for the future. This paper will focus specifically on the Army’s homeland security role, realizing that the Army will participate in future homeland security activities as part of a joint and interagency team.¹³

DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

A brief review of the literature produces a plethora of definitions for homeland security and homeland defense. The two terms are defined in a myriad of ways and are frequently used interchangeably. They are, in fact, distinct from one another in very important ways, yet unavoidably interrelated.

The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (NSHS) defines homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”¹⁴ United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) emphasizes that the national effort referenced above includes players at the local, state and federal levels.¹⁵ Most definitions, despite their differences, acknowledge that homeland security is the foundation of national security.¹⁶

The DOD’s *Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept* provides a useful definition of homeland defense that distinguishes it from homeland security. It defines homeland defense as “the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression.”¹⁷ Therefore, DOD will provide homeland defense by using the capabilities of the military to defeat threats originating from outside of the United States.

The distinction between the two definitions is that homeland defense is focused on threats external to the United States, while homeland security focuses on internal threats. Therefore, in order to assist the Army in determining how it should fulfill its homeland security role, this paper will use the definition of homeland security provided by the NSHS while remaining sensitive to its homeland defense mission as defined by the *Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept*. The United States military is not the lead organization for the accomplishment of most homeland security tasks. Rather, the military must posture itself to supplement the resources of civilian agencies.¹⁸

ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

The framework of our security strategy is actually composed of a series of independent, but complimenting documents. The NSS provides the strategic foundation for this framework and is supported by other documents like the *National Military Strategy* (NMS) and the NSHS. Basic knowledge of each of these documents provides a better understanding of the United States' overarching security strategy.

Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., a former Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, postulated a concept for military strategy that has become widely accepted. He says that, "strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved)."¹⁹ Although developed as a way to conceptualize military strategy, it is frequently applied to other types of strategy – diplomatic, information or economic. Lykke's construct provides a useful way to dissect, analyze and compare individual strategies and will be used to examine the NSS, NMS and NSHS in this paper.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The ultimate aim of the NSS is to guarantee "the sovereignty and independence of the United States, with our fundamental values and institutions intact."²⁰ The NSS identifies freedom, peaceful international relations, and a genuine appreciation for the value of human dignity as important national goals or *ends*.²¹ This strategy further explains that the United States will pursue a proactive course of action against those state and non-state actors who challenge our stated goals through the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction.²²

The NSS identifies eight methods or *ways* to achieve the stated national goals. The ways are to: "champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of

mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure and democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century."²³ This national strategy emphasizes the importance of focusing on those terrorist groups that have global reach and diminishing their capabilities through the determined application of all elements of power, defending American interest at home and abroad, and denying terrorist global safe havens and international support.²⁴

The NSS relies upon the efficient use of all elements of national power as the *means* to achieve the nation's stated goals. Resources are not without limit and must be employed judiciously through a clearly expressed set of means to ensure the desired ends are achieved.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The NMS reinforces the goals listed within the NSS. While the NSS describes how the military complements the other elements of power in a general sense; the NMS guides military activities by establishing a clear set of objectives.

The NMS is based upon three distinct military objectives or *ends* and the *ways* to achieve them.²⁵ The first objective is to protect the United States through an effective defense-in-depth, both overseas and at home, as well as thoughtful support to civil authorities. Pursuit of this objective continues the tradition of defending as far removed from the nation's shores as possible while emphasizing power projection.²⁶ Accomplishment of this objective dictates that the armed forces secure the land, air, sea, and space approaches to the United States as well as protect critical infrastructure. The military may also need to support other lead federal agents during special circumstances.²⁷ The second objective is to prevent conflict and surprise attacks by deterring enemies and maintaining flexibility to respond quickly to global challenges. The NMS explains that this flexibility is made possible by an overseas presence, whether it be permanent or rotational, to express the United States' resolve in critical regions of the world. This forward presence also allows the United States to respond quickly should the need arise.²⁸ The third objective is to defeat our adversaries through swift joint action and the establishment of a positive security environment. The United States can accomplish this objective only if it has access to strategically important regions of the world as well as the necessary capabilities to execute continuous and perhaps simultaneous military operations.²⁹

The *means* to accomplish the military strategy are a fully integrated joint force that possesses the capabilities to operate effectively across the length and depth of the spectrum of

possible operations. The capabilities of this force must be adequately balanced among the services and their respective components. Furthermore, the force must be globally dispersed to ensure a rapid response to threats both at home and abroad.³⁰

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

The NSHS establishes a prioritized list of objectives or *ends* to achieve. These objectives are the prevention of terrorist attacks on the homeland, reduction of the vulnerability to terrorism, and consequence management should the first two objectives fail.³¹ The *ways* are achieved through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its ability to dominate in six specific areas: "intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency preparedness and response."³² The *means* include a wide variety of federal, state, and local organizations and their inherent resources coupled with the national strengths of law, science and technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation.³³

RELATIONSHIP AMONG STRATEGIES

The national strategies previously discussed compliment one another because they possess many common traits. Each of these strategies identifies the ability to deter aggression, defend the homeland, and defeat our adversaries as primary objectives or ends. These objectives are to be accomplished by applying a variety of strategic concepts or ways to include an effective defense-in-depth, forward basing and forward deployment, collective security, and security assistance, as well as legitimate support to civil authorities at home. Each of these strategies also strongly emphasizes the declared right of the United States to act preemptively when it is prudent to do so and especially when necessary to counter threats involving WMD. The means available to execute these strategies include the resources of the military forces of the United States coupled with substantial diplomatic, information, and economic assets.

The NSHS does not duplicate, but rather compliments the NSS by dealing with the challenges of terrorism within the United States. Both documents emphasize the importance of detecting terrorists before they act, taking aggressive action to keep terrorists and their materials out of the country, and continuous and deliberate efforts at home and abroad to counter the threat that terrorist pose.³⁴ Both the NSS and the NSHS place great importance on establishing and maintaining a high level of international cooperation.

HOMELAND SECURITY WITHIN A FORCE SIZING CONSTRUCT

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist Paper Number 8, wrote that, “the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense.”³⁵ Hamilton penned this line in 1787 to help the citizens of New York better understand the strengths inherent to a group of united states. Today, with the passage of more than two centuries and within the context of the Global War on Terrorism, Hamilton’s phrase still rings true. It is important to note that Hamilton was not arguing for a large army, but rather a unity of states to make such an army unnecessary. The federal government today must ensure it has sufficient forces to rapidly defend against the perpetual threats of terrorism, while remaining ever vigilant to ensure those forces do not harm the democracy they are created to defend.³⁶ So how does the military determine how many forces are required?

The QDR of 2001 described a new force sizing construct that the DOD developed to ensure the nation has the necessary resources to provide for national security. The first requirement of this construct is that “the United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. law.”³⁷ This requirement encompasses both homeland security and homeland defense and identifies them as the top priority. There is also a requirement to retain a forward presence in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and Middle East/Southwest Asia to assert our influence in these four regions.³⁸ Furthermore, the United States is to maintain a capability to swiftly defeat aggression against our friends and allies in two theaters at one time while, at the discretion of the president, moving to decisively defeat our enemies in one of these two theaters. This decisive capability must be robust enough to ensure the ability to take and hold territory and effect the change of a regime.³⁹ This force-sizing method is commonly referred to as the “1-4-2-1” construct. Additionally, the forces required to support this method must have the depth to also be able to participate on a rotational basis in a number of peacetime smaller-scale contingencies.”⁴⁰

Even though the QDR of 2001 identified protection of the homeland as the top priority, decision makers within DOD frequently worry that increased resources for homeland security missions equate to fewer resources for the war on terrorism waged overseas. This concern is not unique to DOD, but is also present within the Army. A study by the RAND Corporation faulted the Army for not creating a specific list of required homeland security capabilities.⁴¹ The study partially justifies this reluctance by explaining that any Army actions taken to improve its

homeland security posture entail cost today with only a tentative promise of benefit in the future.⁴²

THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS

Any solution to the problem of how the Army should fulfill its homeland security role must include the reserve forces. Basic knowledge of the Army's reserve forces is necessary to fully investigate this topic. The Army's reserve forces are composed of two components: the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). Historically, these two components have provided the Army with the ability to quickly expand in times of war to meet the nation's needs. However, over the last two decades, the Army has become more dependent upon the reserve components (RC) to fulfill its daily requirements.⁴³ The Army can no longer execute large scale operations without significant support from its RC. The full integration of the active component (AC) and RC has produced an effective fighting force capable of worldwide power projection with the ability to operate for extended periods of time. Each of the RC are unique and provide different capabilities to the total force.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The ARNG provides thirty-eight percent of the Army's force structure and is authorized 350,000 soldiers.⁴⁴ It contributes fifty-three percent of combat units, thirty-eight percent of combat support (CS) units, and thirty-four percent of combat service support (CSS) units.⁴⁵ The ARNG's major organizations are composed of eight combat divisions and fifteen separate combat brigades that are apportioned to war-fighting plans.⁴⁶ Additionally, the ARNG has two Special Forces Groups that provide an added capability to the U. S. Army Special Operations Command.⁴⁷ The ARNG's major organizations are accompanied by CS and CSS units, many of which are identified as high priority and apportioned to the active component.⁴⁸

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

The USAR provides twenty percent of the force structure of the Army and is authorized 205,000 soldiers.⁴⁹ Of these soldiers, 187,000 are in Troop Program Units in a paid drilling status while the remainder are either full-time reservists or Individual Mobilization Augmentees.⁵⁰ The USAR contributes twenty-six percent of the Army's CS units, thirty-four percent of its CSS units, and one percent of its combat units.⁵¹ The USAR has all, or almost all, of some of the Army's critical capabilities. For example, the USAR includes one hundred percent of railway units, one hundred percent of Training Support Divisions, and ninety-eight percent of civil affairs units.⁵²

TITLE 10 AND TITLE 32 DUTY STATUS

It is impossible to fully appreciate the capabilities and limitations of the RC without first gaining an understanding of law as set forth under U.S. Code, Titles 10 and 32. Importantly, the ARNG may be employed in a Title 10 or Title 32 status while the soldiers in the USAR are always in a Title 10 status. The unique ability of Guardsmen to serve in either a Title 10 or a Title 32 status provides the National Guard with an important distinction from the other Army components in the realm of homeland security.

Title 10

Title 10, Section 10102, of the U.S. Code states that “each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require,....”⁵³ Reserve component soldiers in a Title 10 status are essentially augmenting the active component, and therefore have the same responsibilities, limitations, and benefits. These Title 10 RC soldiers are ultimately commanded and controlled by the president, punishable in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, paid by the federal government, and available for worldwide deployment.⁵⁴ National Guard soldiers must convert to a Title 10 status to perform overseas training or missions given to them after mobilization. Any soldier in a Title 10 status within the United States is limited by the Posse Comitatus Act which restricts their use in domestic law enforcement roles.⁵⁵

Title 32

Title 32, Section 501, of the U.S. Code states that “the training of the National Guard shall be conducted by the several States and Territories....”⁵⁶ ARNG soldiers attend military schools, periodic training periods (commonly called “drill”), and annual training in a Title 32 status. These soldiers remain under the command and control of their governor and are disciplined in accordance with the State military code, even though they are paid by the federal government.⁵⁷ Guardsmen in a Title 32 status may deploy within the United States to conduct training or other missions authorized by the federal government.⁵⁸ Importantly, Guardsmen in a Title 32 status are not limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and can perform law enforcement support missions.⁵⁹

ACTIONS TAKEN SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

The United States has not set idly by waiting for another attack. It has made significant organizational changes since the 9/11 terrorist attacks over three years ago. The Homeland

Security Act of 2002 created the DHS, merging twenty-two interrelated, but disparate agencies that had 176,000 employees and a combined budget of \$30.4 billion.⁶⁰ Likewise, the DOD, as it grappled with how to best defend the homeland, established NORTHCOM on October 1, 2002. The DOD has given this command the coordinating authority for all domestic homeland defense activities and tasked it to provide assistance to civil authorities during emergencies.⁶¹ Unfortunately, NORTHCOM has no assigned forces.⁶² The three components of the Army have also taken actions to better support homeland security.

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ACTIVE COMPONENT

The Army has taken steps to enhance its homeland security posture. It currently identifies and places rotational AC units in an elevated alert status for possible deployment in the event of a domestic emergency.⁶³ Specifically, two brigades are identified for potential use in Military Assistance to Civil Disturbance (MACDIS) roles, and five battalions are identified for homeland security tasks as rapid-reaction forces (RRFs) and quick reaction forces (QRFs).⁶⁴ A RRF is usually about a battalion in strength with an eighteen hour deployment timeline, while a QRF is often a platoon or company that must be ready to deploy in two to four hours. Unfortunately, these AC units receive little homeland security training and are in the force pool available for overseas deployment.⁶⁵

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

The USAR, a Title 10 asset, is an extension of the AC and as such is available to the president for use in times of emergency or crisis. It is composed almost entirely of CS and CSS units. These types of units are essential to the combatant commanders' war fighting efforts and are also well suited for many homeland security tasks. The USAR does not have units dedicated to homeland security, but rather leverages inherent capabilities imbedded within existing units. For example, the USAR has sixty-three percent of the Army's chemical units and the most robust decontamination capability within DOD.⁶⁶ It also has fifty-nine percent of the Army's medical capability and ninety-seven percent of all civil affairs units.⁶⁷ Furthermore, it has a large number of logistics, aviation, military police, engineer, and signal units. The USAR has taken some concrete steps to enhance the homeland security capabilities of existing units. It has trained and equipped its reconnaissance units to conduct dismounted nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance, and has also trained and equipped its Dual Purpose Decontamination Companies to conduct casualty decontamination missions.⁶⁸ However, these are additional capabilities added to existing units, not added units.

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The Guard, like the AC and USAR, has also improved its homeland security capabilities. It is in the process of creating fifty-five WMD-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). These WMD-CSTs are in various stages of DOD certification and are located in every state, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.⁶⁹ California is the only state with two teams.⁷⁰ WMD-CSTs are designed to quickly deploy to domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosives (CBRNE) sites, actual or suspected, to identify dangerous substances, assess the potential effects of those substances, advise local authorities on how to manage those effects, and assist with appropriate requests for additional support.⁷¹ Each of these teams is staffed with twenty-two highly trained full-time Army and Air National Guardsmen. Though funded and trained by the federal government, the CSTs are Title 32 assets. It is the state governor who approves requests for assistance by civil authorities.⁷²

In addition to the WMD-CSTs, the ARNG has established ten regionally dispersed CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP).⁷³ These unique units contain a WMD-CST, an enhanced division medical company that can decontaminate and treat 150 people per hour, an enhanced engineer company equipped to conduct search and rescue, and a combat unit trained to support law enforcement.⁷⁴ The CERFPs are composed of existing units that are task organized to respond to a CBRNE attack and are intended to provide a missing capability identified by NORTHCOM.⁷⁵ The individuals who man the CERFPs must be prepared to respond quickly in a Title 32 or state active duty (paid by the state) status.⁷⁶ The units that compose the CERFPs are deployable and available for use by the combatant commanders.⁷⁷

The Guard is also training units as QRFs and RRFs, another missing capability requested by NORTHCOM.⁷⁸ The National Guard has established a QRF in each state to provide the governor or president an armed company sized unit in four hours and the remainder of its battalion in twenty-four hours.⁷⁹ Civilian authorities can request these forces to assist state and local law enforcement agencies to accomplish tasks such as the protection of critical infrastructure and security of WMD incidents sites.⁸⁰ Like the CERFPs, these reaction forces are existing units that are tasked organized and trained to accomplish an additional mission.⁸¹ The availability of these units would be limited by their operation tempo and mobilization status.⁸²

DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

Numerous think tanks have proposed a variety of recommendations of how the military in general, and the Army specifically, could better secure the homeland. A representative sample of those recommendations follows.

HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission, six months before the attacks of 9/11, warned that the United States needed to make significant changes in how it pursued a national security strategy. The commission recommended new priorities for the United States armed forces in general and the National Guard specifically.⁸³ The commission suggested that the Secretary of Defense, by direction of the president, make homeland security the National Guard's primary mission and organize, train, and equip the Guard to successfully fulfill this mission.⁸⁴ The Guard already performs disaster, humanitarian, and consequence management missions in support of the state unencumbered by the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. The Commission saw an enhanced homeland security role as a logical extension of the Guard's constitutionally based authority.⁸⁵ As a community based organization it is already dispersed throughout the United States with strong ties to the state and local leadership and first responders.

GILMORE COMMISSION

The Fourth Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, better known as the Gilmore Commission, recommended in 2002 that units with robust capabilities be dedicated to the combatant commander of NORTHCOM.⁸⁶ The Gilmore Commission also said that specific National Guard units should be given "exclusive" homeland security missions and the training and resources to achieve them.⁸⁷ This proposal has many merits, but does not resolve a very real concern. The active component leadership of the armed forces has traditionally demonstrated a reluctance to fully embrace inward focused homeland security missions. Therefore, if the National Guard is given a primary mission of homeland security, will DOD view this as a lesser role and resist fully funding, equipping, training, and manning these organizations?

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

The Heritage Foundation's Homeland Security Task Force made several recommendations in January 2002. One of the many proposals was to release ARNG and

USAR combat support and combat service support units from their traditional warfighting missions to focus solely on homeland security.⁸⁸ They also recommended that the AC be authorized additional force structure to replace these refocused RC units.⁸⁹ The Heritage Foundation, in a later paper, recommended that the federal government officially make homeland security a “major” mission of the National Guard and ensure that domestic military service is as prestigious and rewarded as overseas service.⁹⁰

RAND CORPORATION STUDY

The RAND Corporation study, *Army Forces for Homeland Security*, offers a variety of Army specific recommendations. The study provides a list of actions the Army could take to improve homeland security. The recommendations on the list are not mutually exclusive or necessarily additive. The study emphasizes that, in the end, the single best solution may be a conglomeration of all the recommendations put forward.

The study begins by advocating that the Army give the ARNG within each state a federal mandate to prepare for homeland security missions both inside and outside their individual states. The ARNG would provide support outside of their states through Emergency Mutual Assistance Compacts (EMACs) or as an integral part of a larger federal force.⁹¹ EMACs provide a process for states to assist other states during emergencies.⁹² These compacts legally require the requesting state to pay for the cost associated with people and equipment provided by another state. Only California and two territories have not ratified or are in the process of ratifying EMACs.⁹³ The units associated with this proposal, according to the study, would simply add homeland security tasks to their training plans.

The RAND study also recognizes that future emergencies involving WMD may require the Army to provide a large and well organized group of soldiers in a compressed period of time.⁹⁴ The study suggests that a brigade-size unit, dedicated to homeland security, be available on a rotating basis between the AC and the ARNG.⁹⁵ The brigade would be a Title 10 unit apportioned to NORTHCOM and rotate between AC and ARNG forces every three to six months.⁹⁶ The study argues that this recommendation creates a dedicated homeland security capability without the requirement to permanently assign a unit to it.⁹⁷ This proposal has its drawbacks in that it could require as many as four different brigades each year. This appears unrealistic for the foreseeable future given the continuing requirements of the Global War on Terrorism.

Another proposal recommended by the study is to allocate AC force structure to combat terrorism.⁹⁸ This “Combating Terrorism Force” would be readily available to conduct

antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities and is envisioned to have the capability to replace the two brigades currently required and identified for possible MACDIS missions within the United States.⁹⁹

The study also echoed the recommendations of other groups when it proposed to give the National Guard the primary responsibility for homeland security.¹⁰⁰ Specifically, the study recommended that ten regional “civil support battalions (CSB)” be established.¹⁰¹ The authors of this recommendation state that this option eliminates the need for the two brigades devoted to the MACDIS missions as well as the active battalions tasked to provide the QRFs and RRFs.¹⁰² The study proposes to form the CSBs from existing yet enhanced Forward Support Battalions and man one third of each battalion with fulltime Guardsmen.¹⁰³

The final proposal of the RAND study is to establish a group of USAR support units with specialized training and dedicated them to homeland security missions.¹⁰⁴ This proposal would require lifting statutory limitations like the Posse Comitatus Act.¹⁰⁵ The USAR has already moved slightly in this direction by building force packages and placing them in a higher state of alert for domestic emergencies.¹⁰⁶ However, these force packages are also available for overseas deployment.

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

The Defense Science Board (DSB) in their *2003 Summer Study on DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security* supported the expansion of the CST concept to a regional level by adding new capabilities to create units modeled after the U.S Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF).¹⁰⁷ The mission of the CBIRF is, “when directed, forward-deploy and/or respond to a credible threat of a CBRNE incident in order to assist local, state, or federal agencies and Unified Combat Commanders in the conduct of consequence management operations by providing capabilities for agent detection and identification; casualty search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated personnel.”¹⁰⁸

COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Analysis of the preceding recommendations reveals important similarities and differences in the options provided. The Hart-Rudman Commission, the Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Corporation each emphasized that the National Guard should have a prominent role in homeland security. Furthermore, the Gilmore Commission, the Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Corporation recommended the creation of units dedicated solely to homeland security. More specifically, the Heritage Foundation recommended that some ARNG and USAR combat

support and combat service support units be dedicated to homeland security missions, while the RAND Corporation stated that homeland security may best be achieved by some combination of dedicated AC, ARNG, and USAR units. The Defense Science Board and the RAND Corporation also specifically recommended the creation of regional National Guard organizations with a homeland security focus. There are also some clear distinctions in the recommendations provided. The Heritage Foundation was the only group to recommend the authorization of additional AC force structure to replace RC force structure moved to homeland security missions. The RAND Corporation provided the only recommendation to dedicate AC force structure to homeland security. The RAND Corporation, as one of its numerous recommendations, also proposed that ARNG units assigned homeland security tasks in addition to their war fighting tasks would be useful.

A RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

Homeland security has been designated as the military's first priority; therefore, it should be resourced accordingly. Even though it is difficult to determine what capabilities are needed given the infinite number of possible homeland security scenarios, the Army does have many useful recommendations by homeland security think tanks, some referenced within this paper, from which to begin. A clearly defined course of action, building upon the efforts already taken by the Army and incorporating the recommendations of trustworthy advisory groups, can help to ensure that future efforts produce the homeland security capabilities required. One such course of action follows.

The Army, as recommended by the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Corporation, should formally identify homeland security as the primary responsibility of the ARNG. The ARNG has a proven record in response to domestic emergencies. This record combined with its forward presence throughout the United States and connectivity to local, state, and federal government makes the ARNG the logical choice for the lead role in homeland security. Furthermore, the flexibility of the ARNG to perform missions in either a Title 32 or a Title 10 status make it uniquely qualified to perform a wide variety of homeland security missions. This does not imply that the other components would not have a role or that the entire Guard force structure should change its focus. Most of the Guard force structure would remain available to the combatant commanders.

It is true that many military organizations can have dual missions. However, in the case of homeland security, not all units should have dual missions. Giving units a dual mission, homeland security and war fighting, does not equate to resourcing the nation's top priority as

the top priority. Specifically, the units that compose the ten CERFPs developed by the ARNG should no longer have a dual mission, but be dedicated entirely to homeland security. This recommendation provides the ten regional CBIRF-like units requested by the Defense Science Board and ensures they are dedicated solely to homeland security as emphasized by the Gilmore Commission, the Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Corporation. The CERFPs would remain in a Title 32 status with the ability to shift to a Title 10 status when warranted by the situation. Furthermore, the ARNG should replace the dual missioned QRF/RRF capability identified in each state with the ten regionally dispersed CSBs recommended by the RAND Corporation. These CSBs should be dedicated solely to domestic missions. The rotational AC units and the ARNG QRF and RRF in each state currently identified to perform these tasks would refocus their efforts on their war fighting missions.

The Army must also continue to use the core competencies of USAR combat support and combat service support units to add depth to its homeland security capability. The USAR has the preponderance of some types of units essential to homeland security missions. Therefore, the Army must conduct a thorough study to identify what capabilities are required for the most likely homeland security scenarios and dedicate an appropriate number of USAR support units as recommended by the Heritage Foundation and the RAND Corporation. The Army study must pay particular attention to the USAR's medical and decontamination units and avoid giving USAR units law enforcement tasks restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act. These units, like the ARNG units dedicated to homeland security, should be geographically dispersed to ensure minimum response time. The remainder of the USAR's force structure, as a Title 10 extension of the AC, would remain forces on war fighting missions. Limited additional AC force structure, as recommended by the Heritage Foundation, may be required to replace the refocused ARNG and USAR units.

Special care must be taken to not delegate units with a homeland security missions to a secondary status, but rather develop a military culture that respects them for the important defense role they would play.¹⁰⁹ It is only possible to achieve this cultural shift if the units are funded, manned, equipped, and trained as high priority units. Furthermore, to create this organizational climate, homeland security personnel assignments must be associated with competitive promotions as well as future command and education opportunities.

CONCLUSION

Homeland security, as defined within the context of the existing security strategy framework, requires the United States, its territory, its people, and its interests to be protected.

The Army should follow a course of action that ensures it can fulfill this very important role. First, the Army should formally give the primary responsibility for homeland security to the ARNG. Second, twenty ARNG battalion size units, to include ten CERFPs and ten CSBs, should be fully resourced and dedicated to homeland security missions. Finally, the Army should conduct a thorough study to determine what USAR capabilities are needed for homeland security and dedicate an appropriate number of regionally dispersed USAR support units. This approach ensures that the nation's first priority of homeland security is adequately resourced with a minimum affect on the military's ability to project globally. Creating dedicated homeland security units is in harmony with the ARNG's traditional role, utilizes the USAR's core competencies, maximizes the efficiency of limited resources, and is ultimately in the best interest of the United States.

WORD COUNT=6,323

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²⁶ Ibid, 9.

²⁷ Ibid.

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